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ABSTRACT
Development and implementation of evidence-based policies is needed in order to ameliorate the rising toll of non-communicable diseases
(NCDs). Alcohol is a key cause of the mortality burden and alcohol policies are under-developed. This is due in part to the global inﬂuence of
the alcohol industry. We propose that a better understanding of the methods and the effectiveness of alcohol industry inﬂuence on public
health policies will support efforts to combat such inﬂuence, and advance global health. Many of the issues on the research agenda we propose
will inform, and be informed by, research into the political inﬂuence of other commercial actors.
Keywords alcohol, public health
Alcohol was a cause of ~3 million deaths in 2016, and is the
leading risk factor for mortality among people aged 15–49
years worldwide, as well as being responsible for extensive
social problems.1 Effective alcohol policies are urgently
needed.2 There is growing evidence that involvement of
alcohol industry actors in policy making results in decisions
that favour commercial interests over public health.3
Alcohol policy lags behind other areas globally, e.g. on obes-
ity or tobacco control, where high level political commit-
ments have already been made, and resourcing and
implementation of these commitments at the national level
are the key issues to be faced.4 Controversies about the rela-
tionships between alcohol industry and public health actors,
such as the recent Drinkaware—Public Health England
partnership, to the detriment of public health5 appear to be
perennial. We argue in this ‘Perspectives’ paper that such
episodes occur because the public health community under-
stands too little about alcohol industry political strategies.
The elephant in the room
There have been warnings about the adverse consequences
of alcohol industry activities for more than a quarter of a
century.6 Whilst evidence-informed national alcohol policies
are recommended by the World Health Organization
(WHO),2 they are resisted by the alcohol industry.7 AWHO
survey of national alcohol policies identiﬁed interference by
the alcohol industry as a key obstacle,8 particularly in relation
to strategies known to be effective in yielding population-
level reductions in the harmful use of alcohol.9 The alcohol
industry is ‘the elephant in the room’, and an obvious prob-
lem that few have been willing to discuss,10 but this has
begun to change.3,11–19 Recent research attention to the alco-
hol industry mirrors the growth of public health research
devoted to corporate actors in other sectors,20–22 for which
the Lancet NCD Action Group recommended the develop-
ment of ‘a new scientiﬁc discipline that investigates industrial
diseases and the transnational corporations that drive
them’20.
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The basic features of the elephant: what
do we already know?
Here we take stock of the emerging literature. The alcohol
industry is organized within beverage classes and includes
the supply chain,11 increasingly concentrated in a small num-
ber of transnational corporations. These companies appear
to have altered the political involvement of industry trade
associations, and developed social aspect/public relations
organizations.11,15 The latter claim to be concerned with
reducing the social harms caused by alcohol as a form of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) but actually serve pub-
lic relations functions for the alcohol industry, framing pol-
icy issues in ways which serve industry interests.23 Industry
actors, whether they be companies or other types of organ-
ization, seek to work in partnership with national govern-
ments, and where possible, have direct involvement in
decision-making within public health policy making.24
Evidence suggests industry political strategies are ﬂexibly
and pragmatically adapted to different policy venues and
institutions, the place of alcohol within the culture, and
wider aspects of the political climate.3,25–27
Industry actors routinely claim that they are committed to
evidence-informed policy, seeking partnerships with govern-
ments, yet to avoid decreasing proﬁts they misrepresent sci-
entiﬁc evidence and oppose regulatory approaches that
scientiﬁc evidence shows are most likely to be effective.28
They instead argue for self-regulation, for which there is lit-
tle supporting evidence.19,29 In the UK, the extent to which
public health evidence has been used in policy making may
help explain the divergence between England and
Scotland.27,30,31 There are also now studies of particular
social aspect/public relations organizations,12,19,32,33 as well
as examination of particular campaigns34 and relationships
with charities.35,36 Social aspects organizations produce or
fund books, reports and policy briefs which provide
industry-favourable and biased views of the evidence, distort
ideas about policy options, and recommend policies unlikely
to be effective.12,19,37 Funding think tanks and other third
parties also appears important in commercial actor
approaches to inﬂuencing alcohol policy making.3,36,38,39
Third party reports provide a parallel literature to the inter-
national, peer-reviewed scientiﬁc literature that industry
actors use to support their policy positions.12,38
When partnership approaches with national governments
fail to inﬂuence policy, confrontational tactics may be
employed. The legality of the Scottish Government’s min-
imum unit pricing measure, for example, was challenged by
industry actors, who successfully delayed implementation by
~6 years,27 in ways similar to the tobacco industry’s efforts
to thwart public health policies.40 International trade law has
also been used by some national governments to oppose the
national alcohol policies of other countries to further the
interests of their national alcohol industries.41
Similarities with other commercial
sectors?
This brief overview of what is known about the alcohol
industry may resonate with perceptions of what powerful
corporations do more broadly. There has been little system-
atic study, however, of industry strategies and tactics across
sectors that produce and market health damaging commod-
ities, and a concomitant lack of attention to the development
of theories to underpin research agendas. The exercise of
policy inﬂuence by powerful corporate actors is a complex
and contested object of study.22 Earlier investigations of the
tobacco industry were greatly advanced by access to internal
company documents, made available following litigation,
providing a wealth of information about tobacco industry
political strategies.42 These documents suggest important
implications of cross-ownership between tobacco and alco-
hol companies,12,43–45 and identify evidence of common
strategies between the two industries to inﬂuence tobacco
control policy.
Ulucanlar and colleagues46 have conceptualized tobacco
industry political activities in terms of narratives articulated
to advance policy preferences in combination with direct
involvements in policy making. The latter include coalition
management (of allies with similar interests) and informa-
tion management (having well developed and timely sup-
portive content available, e.g. policy brieﬁngs).46 A
systematic review identiﬁed many similarities between
tobacco and alcohol industry political activity in respect of
attempts to inﬂuence policy on marketing, with differences
likely due to varying policy contexts and access to decision
makers.47 Another systematic review of alcohol industry
involvement in policy making more broadly, drew similar
conclusions.3 This may be because there are similar stra-
tegic challenges facing both industries in dealing with pub-
lic health policy makers, stemming from the fact that both
products cause addiction and other health harms,22,48,49
and are often used together. The intoxicant effects of alco-
hol, and the resulting harms to self and others, pose add-
itional strategic challenges. The closer the observed
relationships between tobacco and alcohol industry actors
in addressing common challenges, the more research on
the alcohol industry can be informed by the extensive
knowledge available on the tobacco industry.
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In addition to the apparent similarities and overlaps
between the alcohol and tobacco industries, alcohol industry
actors are also linked to other corporate sectors in numerous
ways. Freudenberg draws attention to ﬁnancial institutions,
advertising agencies, law ﬁrms, lobbyists, politicians, scien-
tists and journalists as comprising a ‘corporate consumption
complex’ that supports corporate sectors such as alcohol
and ultimately threatens public health.50
The internal composition of, and political dynamics
within, the alcohol industry may be distinct from other sec-
tors, and there has been little previous research attention to
inter-relationships between corporate sectors other than with
tobacco. The major alcohol producers have expanded their
holdings in the soft drink market, where there is growing
evidence of the health hazards of sugar-sweetened bev-
erages, and consumers may be becoming more health con-
scious.51 Alcohol industry actors use CSR to frame key
issues for the general public health and policy actors,23 and
it has been suggested that CSR may also be designed to sup-
port the marketing of potentially harmful products.51 It is
worth investigating whether CSR may be more integral to
political and/or market strategy development among alcohol
companies than other corporate sectors.
Nationally based supermarkets may be better placed to
inﬂuence national policies than transnational producers.52
Alcohol industry and other corporate interests have varied
forms of political organization, priorities and positioning in
different countries, so it should be expected that political
practices will need to be investigated in dedicated studies at
the national level (as well as at other levels of governance,
such as the local [community], regional [e.g. European
Union] and global [e.g. United Nations/WHO]).
What kinds of research are needed?
Contemporary studies of tobacco, food and other commer-
cial actors relevant to public health rely extensively on docu-
mentary analyses of publicly available data. Data sources
may include annual reports, communications to shareholders
or investors, responses to government consultations, mater-
ial published on company websites and social media, media
coverage of corporate affairs, market intelligence reports,
ofﬁcial reports, freedom of information requests and litiga-
tion records.53 The use of such data sources has made lim-
ited contributions to the study of the alcohol industry to
date, with the possible exception of analyses of public con-
sultation responses.28,54–56
One theoretical approach developed in the alcohol
research community is the epidemiologic cascade model,
which identiﬁes corporations as ‘upstream’ inducers of
disease15,57,58 due to inﬂuence on government policy, which
in turn makes for a more alcogenic environment that results
in increased drinking of their products and non-
communicable diseases (NCDs). This perspective has been
inﬂuential in wider public health, with similar multi-level cas-
cade models having been applied to corporate determinants
of health in other sectors.59–62
Better understanding of the methods and the effective-
ness of commercial actor inﬂuence on public health policies
makes it possible to study ways to combat such inﬂuence.
Moving from what might be characterized as an observa-
tional to an intervention research perspective may take
advantage of dedicated initiatives by policy makers, NGOs
and the public health community more generally, which may
offer possibilities for study as natural experiments to better
manage commercial actor political strategies.63
Alcohol industry opposition to the directions in research
advocated in this paper should be expected, as was the case
when industry pressure recently succeeded in halting a study
of warning labels being undertaken in government liquor
stores in the Yukon, Canada.64 To date, there has been lim-
ited study of alcohol industry involvement in science,65 des-
pite longstanding grounds for concern and the strategic
signiﬁcance of scientiﬁc research for the tobacco
companies.13,66
Several large producers and trade associations have
recently invested signiﬁcant resources in large-sale research
projects which themselves warrant evaluations of scientiﬁc
integrity, and their use for framing purposes in advancing
CSR and commercial agendas. MACH15 was a $100 million,
nine-nation clinical trial mostly funded by major producers
to evaluate the health beneﬁts of a single dose of alcohol
given daily to persons at risk of coronary heart disease.67 A
controversy ensued after the trial began, which precipitated a
NIH investigation, ultimately terminating the trial.68 Other
major research initiatives include the ABInBev Global Smart
Drinking Goals programme which includes funding an
external evaluation of an alcohol intervention toolkit that is
being implemented in ‘pilot’ cities located in six countries.69
Given the need to study the political activities of commer-
cial actors, there are important contributions to be made by
social science disciplines, in tandem with public health
sciences. It is noteworthy that the literature cited to date
largely originates from the latter. The importance of issue
salience with the public has been emphasized by political
scientists as a key determinant of corporate capacity to shape
policy outcomes.70 This ‘quiet politics’ framework for ana-
lysing policy suggests that when and where there is little
media and public discussion of alcohol and alcohol pro-
blems, industry actors are more able to exercise inﬂuence
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over policy. This in turn shapes both the framing of which
problems policy makers may be concerned with, and of pos-
sible solutions to policy issues. There is now research on
misleading claims made by industry actors on cancer direc-
ted at the general population,71 public understanding of the
activities of alcohol industry organizations,72 and other work
on alcohol industry framing of media content.34,73 Such
research, which serves to disrupt the efforts by industry
actors to keep the politics quiet, may thus be particularly
valuable to study.
Interview and ethnographic studies are needed to comple-
ment research using public domain data because much pol-
icy inﬂuence is designed to be invisible, meaning that
reliance on public domain data alone would be of limited
value. Social sciences informed interview studies have been
used to better understand the nature of the political activities
of alcohol industry actors.30,52,74–76 So far as we are aware
there have been no studies of, for example, large alcohol
companies’ use of their ﬁnancial resources, contract lobby-
ists, the functions and operation of trade associations, or
revolving doors personnel movements between corporate
and public sectors anywhere in the world. The wider litera-
ture on lobbying suggests that these drive key asymmetries
in information, personnel and other resources that allow
corporate actors’ inﬂuence in policy making.77 To make pro-
gress in the direction proposed here requires dedicated
research funding as an investment in developing public pol-
icy and protecting it from vested interests. Dedicated fund-
ing may be challenging to obtain, however, until there is
greater awareness of the need to address this major societal
challenge. Researchers should, in the meantime, strive to
build the evidence-base, even in the absence of dedicated
funding, to draw attention to this situation.78
In Box 1 we offer examples of the sorts of research ques-
tions that could be valuable to investigate, based on what is
known about the alcohol industry. Wider research commu-
nity, and indeed public health policy actor, involvement in
developing research agendas will accelerate progress and pri-
ority setting exercises may be useful. Note that few of these
questions apply only to alcohol and alcohol industry actors.
Our intent is not to be prescriptive but rather to stimulate
creative thinking about possible ways forward.
The stakes are high
The accelerating concentration of beer and spirits producers
into a small number of transnational corporations makes the
structure of the alcohol industry increasingly resemble the
tobacco industry, dominated by a small number of global
producers.49 The merger of the two largest brewers in the
world (ABInBev’s acquisition of SAB Miller) means a single
company now produces approximately one-third of all beer
sold globally, a higher market share than possessed by any
one tobacco company.49 The core rationale for this merger
was to develop markets in Africa.79 Alcohol market expan-
sion entails harmful consumption of alcohol becoming more
Box 1. Sample research questions
• How much and in which ways does the history and culture of alcohol in a given country shape consideration of national alcohol policy?
• How do industry actors use CSR, marketing and other means to shape the way policy-makers and the public view alcohol problems and possible
policy responses?
• Which are the key alcohol industry actors to study in respect of policy inﬂuence?
• How similar and different are the strategies of alcohol industry actors to those of tobacco, food, gambling and other unhealthy commodity
industry actors?
• Does strong public opinion on policy issues reduce the degree of unhealthy commodity industry activity concerning those issues?
• How do global unhealthy commodity industry actors adapt their strategies to national-level political institutions?
• What strategies do unhealthy commodity industry actors use to ‘quieten’ the politics concerning their products and activities?
• What are the roles of contract lobbyists, think tanks and other third party actors in shaping relationships with policy-makers?
• What can public registers and freedom of information requests reveal about the scale and patterns of gifts and donations to political parties, and
about lobbying?
• What is the extent and pattern of employing former politicians and civil servants in government relations and similar roles in unhealthy
commodity industry companies?
• Are relationships forged between industry actors and government ofﬁcials in similar ways in low- and middle-income countries compared to high
income countries?
• What countermeasures to unhealthy commodity industry inﬂuence are available in high, middle, and low income countries?
• How do supra-national policy processes inﬂuence national-level policy making?
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prevalent.80 Addressing harmful drinking is a key target of
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).63 Unless the
political inﬂuence of the alcohol industry is effectively con-
strained, it is unlikely that per capita consumption (SDG
indicator 3.5.2) will be reduced in many low and middle
income countries and the global target achieved.18,81
According to former WHO Director, Margaret Chan, alco-
hol industry actors should not be involved in alcohol policy
development.7 Nevertheless, WHO is planning to engage with
the private sector, including ‘economic operators in alcohol
production and trade—to contribute to reducing the harmful
use of alcohol, including labelling, marketing and retail sales
practices’.82 The public health community, including WHO,
needs to better understand the risks intrinsic to such engage-
ments, develop strong procedures for the management of the
inherent conﬂicts of interest, and study how industry actors
use such engagements to their advantage. There is also a need
to develop a narrative on reasonable expectations of alcohol
industry actors in the public interest (see Babor et al.83 for an
example). WHO’s own position that engagement should be
restricted to minimizing the harms of their products and mar-
keting is a particularly important guiding principle.84
The elephant metaphor we have used would not be com-
plete without reference to the parable of the Seven Blind
Men of Hindustan, who encounter a large animal that each
one attempts to describe from the limited perspective of the
body part that they have been able to touch. The moral of
the story is that when observers of the same phenomenon
project their partial experience into their interpretation of a
larger reality, they misunderstand the nature of the beast.
Researchers, similarly, often seek to explain alcohol problems
or other causes of NCDs by examining different aspects of
the industry, such as the type of product, marketing, price or
availability, the amount consumed by an individual or a
population, or its effects on a small number of excessive
users, without recognizing that these are all parts of a larger
whole. We suggest a useful heuristic approach to explaining
the contemporary nature of alcohol’s contribution to NCDs
is to ﬁrst view the global expansion of the alcohol industry
and its concentration in a small number of global producers
as needing to be understood structurally. Secondly, its
increasing use of sophisticated marketing is located within
overarching corporate strategies that also incorporate expli-
citly political strategies designed to create and sustain envir-
onments in which markets can be developed.
The lack of a well established body of research evidence
on the alcohol industry’s political activities limits the ability
of policy makers to develop approaches that protect against
the inﬂuence of these and other powerful commercial inter-
ests. This inﬂuence process is critical to study because
harmful producers have strong vested interests to obstruct
policies that place constraints on their business activities,57,58
and are usually but not always successful in so doing.85
Strengthening research capacity to investigate the alcohol
industry can thus equip public health decision makers to
develop effective alcohol policies. It can also advance global
research agendas on vested interests and policy making, and
contribute more broadly to effective national and global
health strategies, by identifying differences as well as similar-
ities in political strategies across corporate sectors. We suggest
there is a clear need to generate a step change in alcohol pub-
lic health policy research, securing funding and undertaking
programmes of research, developing new research agendas,
and building capacity by developing new public health
oriented networks, including those that link this particular sec-
tor to other corporate sectors. This should be a global health
research priority, and involves expanding the horizons of
alcohol-speciﬁc and broader public health research.86 Such
research is needed to advance public health policy.
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